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Abstract—Virtualization based memory isolation has been
widely used as a security primitive in many security sys-
tems. This paper firstly provides an in-depth analysis of its
effectiveness in the multicore setting; a first in the literature.
Our study reveals that memory isolation by itself is inade-
quate for security. Due to the fundamental design choices in
hardware, it faces several challenging issues including page
table maintenance, address mapping validation and thread
identification. As demonstrated by our attacks implemented
on XMHF and BitVisor, these issues undermine the security of
memory isolation. Next, we propose a new isolation approach
that is immune to the aforementioned problems. In our design,
the hypervisor constructs a fully isolated micro computing
environment (FIMCE) that exposes a minimal attack surface
to an untrusted OS on a multicore platform. By virtue of
its architectural niche, FIMCE offers stronger assurance and
greater versatility than memory isolation. We have built a
prototype of FIMCE and measured its performance. To show
the benefits of using FIMCE as a building block, we have also
implemented several practical applications which cannot be
securely realized by using memory isolation alone.
1. Introduction
Recent advances of hypervisor-based security systems
[1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] against a
subverted kernel are by and large attributed to the memory
isolation feature introduced by modern hardware virtualiza-
tion technology. The cornerstone of memory isolation is the
hypervisor’s privilege and capability of specifying the access
permissions to physical page frames. To prevent a physical
memory region from being illicitly accessed by untrusted
threads (in particular, of kernel privilege), the hypervisor is
instructed to configure the so-called Extended Page Tables
(EPTs) on an Intel’s x86 platform1. The permissions in the
EPT supersedes the access permissions declared in the guest
page table managed by the guest kernel.
For instance, TrustVisor [7] uses the EPT to isolate
memory regions used by a sensitive security task. InkTag
[9] and AppShield [10] isolate the entire address space of
1. The equivalent data structure is called the Nested Page Tables on
AMD’s processors and called the Stage 2 translation on ARM processors.
a process also using EPT. Lares [12] protects its hooks in
guest kernel by setting EPT entries. SecVisor [8] ensures
lifetime kernel integrity via setting access permissions in
the EPT. BitVisor [4] manages guest’s device access by
intercepting such access by EPT. On ARM platforms, OSP
[11] constructs an efficient TEE using Stage 2 translation in
cooperation with TrustZone.
Most existing systems [7], [10], [9], [8] built on memory
isolation implicitly assume a unicore hardware platform.
While XMHF [13] and OSP [11] explicitly described their
mechanisms on a multicore setting, in their designs essen-
tially a single-threaded execution model is forced onto a
multicore platform. Although the unicore assumption sim-
plifies the design and verification of the systems, it is
increasingly distant from recent real-world hardware plat-
forms. Even many low-end mobile phones are equipped with
a dual-core processor, not to mention desktop computers
and high-performance servers. Running multiple CPU cores
in the platform has a non-negligible impact on security,
because the adversarial thread on one core can attack a
trusted thread executing on another core, which is infeasible
in a unicore setting. Hence, there exists an urgent need to
carefully re-evaluate memory isolation security on multicore
systems.
In this work, we conduct an in-depth analysis of memory
isolation in the multicore context. After scrutinizing both the
hardware architecture and the system design, we conclude
that the memory isolation method adopted in the literature
is ineffective on a multicore platform. This is evident from
the attacks we have schemed and implemented on XMHF
[13] and BitVisor [4], respectively. These two attacks allow
the rootkit in the guest to bypass the permission checks
enforced by the EPT. The analysis shows that memory
isolation in the multicore setting faces several intractable
security issues whose solutions (if exist) take a heavy toll
on the hypervisor’s code size and performance.
The deep-seated reason of ineffectiveness lies in the fact
that memory isolation is not complete in that the physical
memory is only one of several types of resources involved
in code execution. From this perspective, we propose to
construct a Fully Isolated Micro Computing Environment
(FIMCE) as a new building block to construct secure sys-
tems on multicore platforms. A FIMCE is fully isolated
from, and yet tightly-coupled with, the untrusted operating
system. Owing to its architectural niche, FIMCE offers
strong security and great versatility. Specifically, it allows
for I/O operations, has a malleable hardware setting, and can
run continuously together with the OS. Because of these
features, FIMCE is a more useful and powerful security
primitive than memory isolation. We have demonstrated
how to use it to tackle certain challenging problems, e.g.,
runtime kernel attestation. We have implemented a proto-
type of FIMCE with its micro-hypervisor. We have also
measured its performance by running benchmarks and built
four applications on top of it to showcase its versatility. The
experimental results confirm that FIMCE’s strong security
and high usability are at the cost of performance since the
OS has one less CPU core to use when the FIMCE is in
operation.
In short, we make the following contributions in this
paper:
1) We show that the widely used virtualization based
memory isolation method is not effective in multi-
core platforms. Our assertion is supported by con-
crete attacks on XMHF and BitVisor and an in-
depth and general examination on design defects
of memory isolation.
2) Based on the analysis of memory isolation short-
comings, we propose a new isolation primitive
called FIMCE. The new scheme provides stronger
security than memory isolation. Moreover, it has a
much wider application spectrum attributing to its
unique architectural niche.
3) We implement a prototype of FIMCE and use it
as a building block to construct several applica-
tions to showcase its valuable features including the
modularized software infrastructure, I/O support,
the malleable hardware setting and runtime trust
anchor. We measure its performance and argue that
the security gain outweighs the system’s perfor-
mance loss incurred by the core removal.
ORGANIZATION. In the next section, we explain the
background of address translation and memory access in
multicore systems. Then, we show two concrete attacks on
XMHF and BitVisor in Section 3, followed by an in-depth
examination of memory isolation in Section 4. We propose
the design of FIMCE in Section 5. Section 6 evaluates
the security and performance based on experiments with
a prototype of FIMCE. We discuss the related work in
Section 7 and conclude the paper with Section 8.
2. Background
This section explains the memory access paradigm on
a symmetric multiprocessor (SMP) system with hardware-
assisted virtualization. A virtual address (VA) is firstly
translated into a Guest Physical Address (GPA) by using
the guest page table managed by the kernel. A GPA is
then mapped to a Host Physical Address (HPA) by using
the Extended Page Table managed by the hypervisor. In
the SMP setting, each CPU core independently accesses
the shared main memory. Each core has its own MMU to
walk through the guest page table and the EPT. Typically,
a common set of EPTs are used globally by all CPU cores.
This approach avoids synchronization of EPT updates and
improves efficiency. Each CPU core has its own CR3 register
pointing to the guest page table in use. They use the same
or different guest page tables depending on the kernel’s
scheduling. To reduce the latency due to two-level address
translation, each core is equipped with its own independent
Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB), which caches recently
used entries in the guest page table and the EPT. Note that
both address mapping and the associated access permission
are stored in the TLB. To access a virtual address from a
core, its TLB is looked up first. If a TLB entry is hit, the
corresponding page table is not used during this translation.
We use Figure 1 to illustrate the paradigm.
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Figure 1. The paradigm of memory access in an SMP setting. Core 1 has
TLB misses and accesses the memory via two page tables whereas Core n
has TLB hits and accesses the memory without consulting any page table.
Unlike data cache and instruction cache, the consistency
between the TLB and the page tables in the main memory is
maintained by the software, instead of the hardware. There-
fore, when an address mapping is updated, the software
needs to explicitly invalidate the corresponding TLB entry.
Moreover, the hardware does not enforce coherence
among the TLBs on different cores. All such operations
need to be explicitly carried out by software as well. When
more than one core accesses an address space, the core that
changes the mapping is supposed to perform TLB shootdown
to invalidate any existing entries on other cores. Typically, it
is achieved by using the Interprocessor Interrupts (IPIs) for
this purpose. Specifically, the initiating core fires an IPI to
each core that needs to invalidate its TLBs. On modern x86
platforms, the Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
(APIC) interfaces with the bus for receiving and sending
IPIs. The IPI is received by the other cores and treated
exactly the same way as an external interrupt. A handler is
invoked and the specified TLB entry is invalidated. In this
way, the consistent view of the address space is maintained
across all CPU cores.
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3. Attacks
As a prologue to our in-depth analysis and the proposal,
we present concrete attacks on two open-source micro-
hypervisors running on a PC with multiple cores. The
success of the attacks indicates that memory isolation on
the multicore setting requires a meticulous checking of all
implementation details.
Consider a typical isolation scenario where a security
sensitive application requests the hypervisor to protect a
given page by setting its access permission as, for exam-
ple, read-only in the EPT. The objective of the attack is
for the malicious OS to successfully access the protected
page without complying to the EPT permission setting. The
general idea behind the attacks is to use a stale TLB entry.
Obviously, if a CPU core still stores the TLB entry for the
protected page after the change on the EPT, the core can ac-
cess the page with the priorly granted permissions. Although
the TLB invalidation is widely known as an indispensable
step, it is not trivial to implement it without any flaw.
3.1. Stifling Attack
In order to invalidate the TLBs in other cores, the
hypervisor has to preempt the running threads on those
cores. A typical way of communicating with other cores is
the IPI. For this purpose, the hypervisor sets the External-
interrupt Exiting bit in all logic cores’ VMCS structures
during system initialization. After configuring the EPT to
protect a page specified by an application, the hypervisor
broadcasts an IPI which triggers VM-exit in all receiving
cores.
The stifling attack is to prevent a CPU core under the
malicious OS’s control from responding to the hypervisor’s
IPI so that this core’s TLB is not invalidated by the hy-
pervisor. The attack exploits a hardware design feature to
block all maskable external interrupts, including IPI. On x86
platforms, the IPI handler is expected to perform a write to
the EOI register in the local APIC before executing iret.
This operation signals the end of the current IPI handling
and allows the local APIC to deliver the next IPI message
(if any) to the core. If no such write is performed, the
local APIC withholds subsequent IPIs and never delivers
them. Note that using the interrupt masking bit (namely
EFLAGS.IF) cannot achieve the same malicious goal,
because it is overridden by the External-interrupt Exiting
bit in the VMCS set by the hypervisor. Also note that
setting the External-interrupt Exiting bit does not mandate
automatic EOI write by hardware, it is always the software’s
responsibility to perform such write, by either the hypervisor
or the OS.
Given this observation, we scheme the attack to bypass
the EPT’s access control. Suppose that the victim application
occupies core v while the kernel runs in two threads in
core 1 and core 2 respectively. The steps of the attack are
described below in the temporal order with a visualization
in Figure 2.
1) At core v: The victim application starts to run and
writes data into a memory buffer.
2) At core 1: The malicious kernel maps the guest
physical address of the buffer into its own address
space by changing its guest page table. It reads the
buffer so that the corresponding EPT entry is loaded
in its TLB. It also disables interrupt and preemption
so that it is not scheduled off from core 1 in order
to avoid any TLB invalidation.
3) At core 2: Another thread of the malicious kernel
sends an IPI to core 1 by using an legitimate IPI
vector for OS synchronization.
4) At core 1: The malicious IPI handler returns with-
out writing to the EOI register of the local APIC.
As a result, subsequent IPIs are never accepted by
core 1.
5) At core v: The victim issues a hypercall for mem-
ory protection. The hypervisor updates the EPT for
all other cores to disallow accesses. It broadcasts
an IPI to trigger VM exit on other cores.
6) At core 1: The IPI from core v is not delivered
to core 1. The kernel thread can continue to read-
/write the isolated buffer without trigger any EPT
violation exception, because the core’s MMU uses
the EPT entry in the TLB with the permissions
which are set prior to the hypercall.
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Figure 2. Illustration of the stifling attack bypassing the EPT’s access
control over the victim’s data. Grey regions are controlled by the attacker.
We have implemented the attack on top of the BitVisor
[4] with slight changes on its EPT management function and
interrupt handling. The experiment shows that the kernel
successfully continues its write access to the target page
without triggering any page fault, after the page’s permission
in the EPT is changed into read-only.
One possible solution to the stifling attack is to virtualize
local APICs so that the hypervisor intercepts the external
interrupts and enforces EOI writes. However, this approach
is against the goal of performance optimization proposed
in [14], [15] which advocate removing the hypervisor from
the code path handling interrupts. Moreover, it is against
the purpose of using a tiny hypervisor as it increases the
hypervisor’s code size and complexity.
3
An alternative is to resort to non-maskable interrupts
(NMIs) instead of IPIs. NMIs are delivered immediately by
the local APIC to the CPU core as they are usually sent by
hardware such as watchdogs to indicate critical hardware
failure which needs immediate attention. However, it is
strongly discouraged to use software to generate NMIs be-
cause of its complex handling. Moreover, it requires a high
level of expertise to implement a proper NMI handler [16]
because it needs to deal with recursive execution. Briefly
speaking, once an NMI is delivered to a core, subsequent
NMIs are blocked until the core executes iret. If the
NMI handler causes any exception, the exception handler’s
iret immediately allows the next NMI to be delivered
while the present one is still in processing. From the system
perspective, it has risks to use the hypervisor to issue and
handle NMIs.
3.2. VPID Attack
XMHF [13] is a micro-hypervisor on x86 platforms that
explicitly takes the multicore setting into the design con-
sideration. In fact, XMHF [13] enforces a single threaded
execution model for the hypervisor. When one core traps
to the hypervisor space, it “quiesces all other cores” by
broadcasting an NMI which causes a VM exit and effec-
tively pauses the execution of all other threads across the
system. Therefore, it is not subject to the stifling attack.
Nevertheless, it still has another TLB-related vulnerability,
although XMHF has been formally verified.
The early hardware virtualization flushes the TLB on
VM Exits, because the hypervisor uses an independent
address space from that of the guest. Since this approach
incurs a great overhead due to TLB misses after the VM
(re)entry, more recent x86 processors introduce a feature
called Virtual Processor ID (VPID). It assigns identifiers to
address spaces of each virtual core and of the hypervisor and
also tags TLB lines with the respective identifiers. When an
TLB entry is hit during translation, it is valid only when its
VPID tag matches the VPID of the present address space.
As a result, a VM exit does not imply the invalidation of
all TLB entries of a core.
This performance improvement unfortunately dents the
security of the hypervisor. Since not all TLBs are evicted
by the hardware during a trap to the hypervisor, the stale
entries must be invalidated by the hypervisor. However, the
XMHF hypervisor neglects this issue. It assigns VPID 0
to the hypervisor and VPID 1 to the guest. Unfortunately,
there is no explicit invalidation of TLB entries tagged with
VPID 1 during the handling the quiesce-NMI. Out of this
observation, we devise the following attack by which the
guest OS can continue its access to a page despite the access
policy update at the EPT.
1) At core v: The victim application starts execution,
it allocates a page which expects memory isolation.
2) At core 1: The malicious kernel running on core 1
maps the buffer into its own space, reads it once
so that an TLB entry is loaded by the MMU. It
disables interrupt and preemption so that the TLB
entry is not evicted.
3) At core v: The victim application performs a hy-
percall to the XMHF hypervisor. The hypervisor
issues an NMI used to quiesce other cores and
clears the access permission for the page in the
EPT after all other cores are paused.
4) At core v: The execution returns to the victim
application.
5) At core 1: The guest OS resumes its execution.
Due to incomplete TLB invalidation, the stale entry
still exists. The guest OS continues to read and
write the isolated buffer, regardless what the per-
mission on the EPT is set.
We have implemented the attack on the latest version
of XMHF on an Intel platform. As a proof of concept, we
build a hypapp based on the APIs provided by the XMHF
core. The hypapp takes an address of a physical page as
input and sets its access permission in EPTs as inaccessible
via the EPT manipulation API. The hypapp is invoked via
a hypercall from an application bound to a core. The kernel
runs a malicious thread on another core to continuously
access the page. We observed that the malicious thread keeps
a stale TLB entry and is able to successfully read and write
the target page without triggering EPT violation, although
it is marked as inaccessible in the EPT.
Caveat. We reiterate that the intention of presenting the
attacks above is not to show the vulnerability of existing
schemes, but to emphasize that applying memory isolation
on the multicore setting is not as straightforward as one
thinks. The low-level system implementation subtleties, if
not treated properly, may compromise the security. We
remark that the TLB invalidation problem is only the tip of
the iceberg of the difficulty of securely implement memory
isolation on a multicore setting.
4. In-depth Examination of Memory Isolation
Memory isolation is the primitive used in almost all
virtualization based security systems [9], [10], [17], [18],
[8], [7], [13], [19], [8]. It denies any unauthorized access
to the concerned physical memory pages. Most existing
schemes in the literature focus on how to make use of it
to achieve their high-level security goals, without carefully
examining the technical details. In this section, we first
revisit the existing memory isolation technique and then
analyze the complications.
Before proceeding to the analysis, we spell out the
system model and the threat model used in the rest of the
paper. The system in consideration is a commodity multicore
platform running a bare-metal micro-hypervisor with a sin-
gle domain called the guest. The adversary is the kernel of
the guest subverted by a rootkit. With the kernel’s privilege,
the rootkit can launch arbitrary software-based attacks, such
as illicit memory accesses and manipulating the execution
context. It may even have a CPU emulator to emulate the
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hypervisor’s behavior. We assume that BIOS, the firmware
and the hardware in the platform are of integrity in the sense
that their behaviors comply with the respective specifications
and are not subverted by the adversary. We assume that
the micro-hypervisor code, data and control flow are not
compromised either during boot-up or at runtime. We do
not consider side channel attacks or denial of service attacks.
For the convenience of presentation, we use “the guest” and
“the kernel” throughout the paper to refer to the virtual
machine in the system and its kernel, respectively. Note
that the models described above are the same used in the
literature [9], [10], [17], [18], [8], [7], [13], [19].
4.1. The Common Practice
Early memory isolation schemes (e.g., Overshadow [2])
use para-virtualization with the shadow page tables and
the hypervisor effectively manages all address mappings.
With the advances of CPU virtualization, most of recent
systems (e.g., [13], [7]) rely on the access control feature
provided by EPT to realize memory isolation. To the best
of our knowledge, most schemes are presented without
stating whether they run on the multicore setting, except
XMHF [13]. We consider a generic procedure in the uni-
core setting to explain the common practice of memory
isolation widely used in the literature, including InkTag[9],
AppShield[10], Heisenbyte[17], SPIDER[18], SecVisor[8],
TrustVisor[7] and Sentry[19]. The isolation runs in the
following steps.
• Step 1. The hypervisor is instructed to isolate a page
at the virtual address Va (e.g., via a hypercall) so
that Va can be accessed by the authorized code with
permission p and by any unauthorized code with
permission pˆ. For instance, p can be read and write
while pˆ can be read-only so that unauthorized code
cannot modify the page.
• Step 2. The hypervisor walks through the present
kernel page table to obtain the corresponding guest
physical address Ga and then walks through the
EPT to locate the entry   that maps Ga to the
corresponding host physical page Hp. It sets the
permission bits on   according to pˆ.
• Step 3. At runtime, if the hypervisor determines that
the requested access is from the authorized code,
it sets the permission bits on   according to p.
When the hypervisor detects that the authorized code
execution is to be scheduled off from the CPU (e.g.,
due to interrupts), it flushes the TLBs and sets back
the pˆ permission on  .
An variant of the above method is to switch the mapped
physical address inside   so that different views of physical
memory are presented depending on the trustworthiness
of the execution thread on the core. SPIDER [18] and
Heisenbyte [17] are exemplary systems using this approach.
4.2. Complications of Memory Isolation In Multi-
core Setting
The aforementioned memory isolation procedure runs
securely on a unicore platform. However, the situation be-
comes much more complex due to parallel execution in the
multicore setting. A malicious thread on one core can attack
the trusted code execution on another core. In the following,
we present an in-depth analysis of the complications from
three perspectives.
4.2.1. Cumbersome EPT Management. As shown in Sec-
tion 2, each CPU core in the multicore setting makes in-
dependent accesses to the physical memory. Therefore, the
access permission p for the trusted code and the permission
pˆ for the untrusted code may co-exist in the system, in
contrast to permission switches described earlier in the
unicore setting.
This fact gives rise to two implications. Firstly, it is no
longer sufficient to maintain a single set of EPTs with all
cores given the same access rights. At least two sets of EPTs
are needed with one for the trusted execution and the other
for the untrusted. In general, consider a system with n CPU
cores and k applications requesting for memory isolation.
The hypervisor has to record k + 1 different versions of
permission settings. In the worst case, the hypervisor has
to properly install n different EPTs at runtime for each
core. A more complicating issue is that the hypervisor
should have an algorithm to detect potential conflicts and/or
inconsistency among the permission policies. The load of
managing multiple EPTs not only expands the hypervisor
code size, but also significantly complicates its logic.
The second issue is about the switch from the high-
privilege permission (e.g., read and write) to the low priv-
ilege permission (e.g. non-accessible). The privilege down-
grade mandates that all related permission records have
to be updated in an atomic way, including the page table
entries and the TLB entries. Our attacks in Section 3 have
shown that it requires knowledge of the low-level hardware
behavior and sophisticated skills to update or invalidate all
obsolete permissions.
4.2.2. Insecure Guest Page Table Checking. In the com-
mon practice described in Section 4.1, the trusted thread and
untrusted threads use distinct EPT settings. However, they
may use the same segment register and the guest page tables
which are managed by the guest kernel and affect the CPU
core’s memory access. Stephen et. al. have used the Iago
attack [20] to show that the malicious kernel can manipulate
the VA-to-GPA mapping to attack memory isolation. On a
unicore system, the hypervisor can arguably verify such
data structures before entering the isolated environment.
Because once verified, they are not subject to malicious
modification because there is only one core, so that the
guest OS is paused. Following this approach, InkTag [9],
TrustVisor [7] and AppShield [10] have implemented kernel
page table verification/protection when the hypervisor sets
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up the isolation environment and while the protected thread
is in execution.
However, although these schemes are secure in a unicore
setting, they are vulnerable to the race condition attacks
in the multicore setting. Note that the verification of the
guest page table cannot be instantly completed. The hy-
pervisor has to walk through the entire guest page table
and sets the permission bits in the EPT. InkTag, TrustVisor
and AppShield do not enforce core quiesce. Therefore, the
guest kernel and the hypervisor can execute simultaneously.
Therefore, the race condition attack can cause the access
control policy to be enforced on unintended pages.
We use the following example to illustrate this. Suppose
that a security-sensitive program is just launched and the
hypervisor needs to setup its isolated environment. In order
to lock and verify the current guest page table, the hyper-
visor has to find where it resides. In other words, it has to
find out all physical memory pages used to store the guest
page table, so that it is able to configure the corresponding
EPT to lock it. Unfortunately, the hypervisor does not have
the prior knowledge, because the guest page table is priorly
managed by the kernel. Therefore, the hypervisor has to
traverse all guest page table entries starting from the root
pointed to by CR3 in order to find out the physical locations.
Page table walking with software is a lengthy operation
because it involves a number of mappings and memory
access operations. Thus, the guest OS running on another
core has a non-negligible time window to change one of the
leaf page tables after it is verified but before it is locked.
If the traversal is along the ascending order of the address
space, the page table pages for the lower end address are
easier to attack because they are exposed with a longer time
gap. In our experiment, it takes around 120,000 CPU cycles
to lock the entire page table used by a simple user-space
application, which is long enough for the kernel to tamper
with one page table entry. As a result, the guest page table
locked up by the hypervisor is not the actual one used by the
security-sensitive program which could still be vulnerable
to the Iago-like attack. More generally, any data structure
used during the address translation such as the segment
descriptors are also potential attack vectors.
Note the core quiesce technique used in XMHF can
defeat the aforementioned race-condition attack, since it
freezes all untrusted execution while the hypervisor is in ex-
ecution. However, it incurs a remarkably high performance
cost. The hypervisor needs to find out all physical pages
for the guest page table, sets the corresponding EPT to
prevent the kernel’s modification, and verifies whether the
guest page table harbors any poisonous mappings. Note that
the system is effectually frozen throughout these three steps.
Another solutions is to use the shadow page table instead
of the EPT when the guest is launched. Obviously, the
method does not fully leverage the hardware virtualization
advantage. It affects the platform performance and signifi-
cantly expands the hypervisor’s size. We argue that it is not
an ideal solution for the micro-hypervisor like XMHF and
TrustVisor.
4.2.3. Incapable Thread Identification. Since the trusted
threads and the untrusted threads run in parallel, the hy-
pervisor has to differentiate them and apply the appropriate
EPTs for the respective execution. Therefore, a prerequisite
of secure isolation is to correctly identify the subject that
intends to access the protected memory pages.
The subject identity of the security-sensitive program
piggybacks on a kernel-level abstraction, e.g., a process
or a thread. A high-level access policy is in the form of
“Process X is allowed to read and write page #n; and other
processes cannot access”. To enforce such a policy in the
EPT, the hypervisor maintains the association between the
process X and the protected physical pages. Typically, it
is implemented by using the present CR3 register value
(e.g., as in TrustVisor [7]) or the combination of CR3
register value and the address of the kernel stack (e.g., as
in AppShield [10]).
It is a challenging task for the hypervisor to correctly
identify the subject requesting memory access. The hypervi-
sor sits underneath the OS and lacks the semantic knowledge
of the execution. It is only able to acquire those hardware-
related information, such as the instruction pointer stored
in the EIP register and the page table root address stored
in the CR3 registers. Note that the application semantics
of those data is translated by the kernel. For instance, the
EIP register stores the virtual address of the next instruction
to execute. It requires the mapping defined by the kernel
to derive its guest physical address. Since the kernel is a
potential adversary, it is infeasible for the hypervisor to
correctly infer the logical representation of the subject from
the hardware information.
Overshadow [2] uses the hypervisor-supplied Address
Space ID (ASID) and its associated thread context’s address
to identify the subject. Nonetheless, the guest page table is
also involved in storing and retrieving the ASID. Therefore,
its security remains as weak. In the following, we consider
a security-sensitive program P whose data buffer has been
isolated by the hypervisor and show the impersonation at-
tacks CR3 and ASID based identification.
Impersonation Attack. Suppose that the CR3 register is
used to identify the subject. The malicious guest OS can
launch a malicious process P 0 with the same CR3 content
as P , but with a different VA-to-GPA mapping. When P 0
issues a hypercall, the hypervisor is fooled to believe that
the subject is program P . As a result, P 0 may exfiltrate
the secret of P and tamper with its data. Enclosing kernel-
related objects such as the stack address does not improve
the situation because they are still subject to forgery. Sup-
pose that a hypervisor-supplied object such as the ASID is
used to identify the subject. Program P needs to store its
ASID and to explicitly supply it to the hypervisor in order to
access its isolated memory. Nonetheless, this method ends
up with the chicken-and-egg dilemma. On the one hand,
if P ’s ASID is unprotected, it can be used by P 0 with
the kernel’s assistance. On the other hand, if the ASID is
restricted to be used by P only, the hypervisor does not
have the clue to decide when the ASID is used by P or P 0
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which is also an identification problem.
4.2.4. Summary. To summarize, memory isolation in the
multiple core setting is challenging. Most complications are
caused by two factors. One factor is due to the multicore
setting. Namely, a mixture of trusted and untrusted threads
run at the same time. The second factor is due to the design
defect of the current memory isolation technique used in
the literature. Namely, the isolation technique is incomplete.
The boundary between the trusted and the untrusted is only
drawn on the GPA-to-HPA mapping. At least, the VA-to-
GPA mappings and the CPU core are still controlled by the
kernel, which exposes a large attack surface to the adversary.
5. Full Isolation on Multicore Platforms
Considering the pitfalls of memory isolation in multi-
core systems, we propose to isolate an entire computing
environment including the CPU core, the memory region,
and (optionally) the needed peripheral device. To be differ-
entiated from the existing memory only isolation, we name
the new isolation paradigm as fully isolated micro computing
environment or FIMCE.
In the following, we describe the hardware and software
architecture of FIMCE, and then present its versatile usages
beyond isolation.
5.1. FIMCE Architecture
Figure 3 depicts the architectural difference between the
memory isolation used in existing schemes and the full
isolation of FIMCE. The main distinction is the boundary
between the trusted and the untrusted.
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Figure 3. The comparison between memory isolation and full isolation. The
grey areas denote resources controlled by the adversary while the areas with
dots denoted isolated resources.
Core Isolation. Memory isolation neglects the CPU cores
entirely, which is the reason why it faces the challenges
of managing the EPT and identifying threads as explained
in Section 4. The CPU core used by the protected task is
isolated from the untrusted OS for two reasons. One is
to avoid the same flaw as in memory isolation and the
second is that the untrusted OS may use the inter-core
communication mechanisms such as INIT signals to attack
the task. Note that core isolation does not mean that a CPU
core is permanently dedicated to a protected task. In fact,
the task can migrate from one core to another. However,
whenever it runs, it exclusively occupies the CPU and is not
preemptible by other threads, until it quits or is terminated
by the hypervisor.
In addition, the hypervisor sets up the virtual core of
the isolated environment such that external interrupts, NMI,
INIT signal and SIPI are all trapped to the hypervisor.
Once VMX is enabled on an Intel platform, the hard-
ware automatically triggers VM Exit when receiving INIT
signal and SIPI. To intercept NMI and external interrupts
(including IPI), the hypervisor sets the NMI exiting bit
and the External-interrupt exiting bit in the pin-based VM-
Execution control bitmap of the VMCS structure. If an ex-
ternal interrupt has a non-empty handler installed inside the
FIMCE, the hypervisor passes it to the FIMCE; otherwise,
the interrupt is dropped.
CAVEAT. Our notion of CPU isolation has a different
implication from the one in the system literature. The latter
is mainly for performance loading and does not consider the
kernel as an adversary.
Memory Isolation. Memory isolation still plays an im-
portant role in FIMCE. Existing memory isolation schemes
in essence only separate the host physical address space
of the security task from the rest. Since the guest page
table is managed by the guest kernel, the security task’s
virtual address space and guest physical address space are
still under the guest kernel’s control.
In contrast, memory isolation in FIMCE is complete.
The entire address translation process is out of the guest
kernel’s reach. All data structures used in the translation pro-
cess such as the guest page table and the Global Descriptor
Table (GDT) are separated from the kernel. Moreover, the
physical memory pages used by a FIMCE is allocated from
a region reserved by the hypervisor. Since those pages are
never mapped into the guest, the guest does not have any
valid TLB entry to access it.
I/O Device Isolation. We utilize DMA remapping and
interrupt remapping supported by hardware based I/O vir-
tualization, together with VMCS configuration and EPTs to
ensure that a FIMCE has exclusive accesses to peripheral
devices annexed to it. Firstly, any I/O command issued
from the guest to the FIMCE device should be blocked. For
port I/O devices, the hypervisor sets corresponding bits in
the guest’s I/O bitmap. For MMIO devices, the hypervisor
configure the guest’s EPT to trap accesses to the MMIO
region of the device.
Secondly, the interrupt and data transferred by a FIMCE
device is only bound to the FIMCE core. For this purpose,
the hypervisor configures the translation tables used by
DMA and interrupt remapping. The former redirects DMA
accesses from the device to the memory region inside the
FIMCE and the latter ensures that interrupts from the device
are delivered to the FIMCE core rather than other cores of
the guest.
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5.2. Modularized Software Infrastructure of
FIMCE
It is widely recognized that memory isolation schemes
do not furnish the isolated task with the dependent software
modules, which is one of the reasons why they require the
task to be self-contained. In contrast, FIMCE has the inborn
support for dynamically setting up the software infrastruc-
ture e.g., libraries, drivers and interrupt handlers, to cater to
the task’s needs.
Although it is theoretically possible to load a full-fledged
OS into a FIMCE, our design goal is to use a FIMCE
as a nimble environment hosting critical tasks within a
program. Therefore, we propose to use a structured way
to construct the needed software infrastructure. Based on
their functionalities, a set of software modules called pillars
are stored in the disk in the form of ELF files. A pillar
is a self-contained shared library for a particular purpose.
For instance, a TPM pillar consists of all functions needed
to operate the TPM chip. Based on the protected task’s
demand, the guest OS loads the needed pillar files from the
disk to the memory. Then, the hypervisor relocates them
into the FIMCE. To ensure the security, the hypervisor also
takes a whitelist approach to verify their integrity and finally
links them with the task.
The FIMCE only has a single and non-stopping execu-
tion thread since it is exclusively used by the protected task.
When I/O operations are needed, the hypervisor also loads
the interrupt handler table to the environment. When the
protected task only accesses the enclosed memory, it can be
optionally granted with Ring 0 privilege so that no context
switch is needed in dealing with interrupts.
5.3. Applications of FIMCE
Although the basic idea of FIMCE is intuitive, it is ad-
vantageous over other isolation techniques on x86 platforms
in terms of versatility. We briefly describe below several
ways to use FIMCE. Due to the length limit, we leave the
details in the full version of the paper.
Isolation. FIMCE surely supports conventional isolation
applications e.g., to protect a decryption or authentication
function. FIMCE offers better efficiency and stronger se-
curity than memory based isolation, since all those hassles
described in Section 4.2 are no longer applicable. FIMCE
also allows I/O operations which is infeasible for either SGX
or memory isolation. In Section 6, we report our experiments
of FIMCE with password-based decryption and Apache.
Malleability. The isolated FIMCE environment can be
configured and used in non-standard ways to cater to the
security goals. For instance, the hypervisor can twist the
CPU registers and even the TPM configuration as needed.
To illustrate the benefit of a malleable FIMCE, we
consider the challenge of ensuring that an application P ’s
long term secret k can only be accessed in an isolated
environment. Suppose that k has been initially encrypted
with the binding to the isolated environment. The difficulty
lies in how to authenticate the thread that requests to enter
into the isolated environment and to access k.
Since the application cannot hide any secret in the unpro-
tected memory against the OS, both have the equal knowl-
edge and capability in terms of presenting the authentication
information to the hardware such as the TPM chip or the
SGX enclave. One may suggest to leverage the hypervisor
to perform authentication as shown in [7]. However, as we
have analyzed in Section 4.2, it is also challenging for the
hypervisor to securely authenticate the application.
FIMCE offers an elegant solution, attributing to its mal-
leable environment. In our solution, the hypervisor uses the
TPM Locality 2 and assigns the OS with Locality 0 and
the code inside a FIMCE with Locality 1. During boot up,
the DRTM extends PCR17 and PCR18 with the hypervisor
and other loaded modules. When a FIMCE is launched, the
hypervisor resets PCR20 and extends PCR20 with all code
and data loaded in the FIMCE. The protected code in turn
extends it with all relevant data, and seals the secret k with
PCR17, PCR18 and PCR20. Once the seal operation is
done, it extends PCR20 with an arbitrary binary string to
obliterate PCR20 content and relinquishes its Locality-1
access so that the OS is free to use the TPM. The same
steps are performed in order to unseal k.
Note that PCR17 and PCR18 are in Locality 4 and 3
respectively. The hardware ensures that they cannot be reset
by any software. During the boot up, the DRTM extends
these two registers with the loaded modules. Their correct
content implies the loading time integrity of the hypervisor.
Since the OS is in Locality 0, it does not have the privilege
to extend or reset PCR20, even though it can prepare
the same input used by the hypervisor and application P .
Other (malicious) applications in their own FIMCEs cannot
impersonate P either. PCR20 bears the birthmark of a
FIMCE instance because the code in an FIMCE cannot reset
PCR20. Therefore, other applications cannot remove their
own birthmarks to produce the same digest as P does.
The advantage of our method is that the hypervisor does
not hold any secret and is oblivious to the application’s logic
and semantics. Besides the stronger security bolstered by
the hardware, it is beneficial to minimize the TCB size and
supports process migration.
Runtime Trust Anchor. Another noticeable strength of
FIMCE is its ability to provide a secure environment that
runs in parallel, and yet tightly-coupled, with the untrusted
OS. The environment can host a trust anchor to tackle
runtime security issues such as monitoring and policy en-
forcement. To show the benefit of a runtime trust anchor,
we sketch out two secure systems below.
The first system is to protect sensitive files in the
disk from being modified or deleted by the untrusted OS.
This problem has been considered by Guardian [21] and
Lockdown [22]. The scheme used in Guardian cannot be
scaled to protect arbitrary files chosen by applications while
Lockdown suffers from performance loss as every disk I/O
operation causes a context switch (if not optimized). In our
approach, the hypervisor isolates the disk to the FIMCE. A
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disk I/O filter is loaded in the FIMCE. It continuously loads
the disk DMA request placed by the OS in a shared buffer.
If the request is compliant with the security policy, the filter
forwards it to the disk controller. Otherwise, it is dropped.
All disk interrupts are channeled to the OS so that the filter
is not necessarily involved in handling them. We expect
a performance advantage of FIMCE based disk protection
over Lockdown, because there is no context switches during
disk operations. Note that a similar scheme can be used for
filtering network packets.
The second system is about the runtime attestation of
the OS behavior. Most existing remote attestation schemes
[23], [24], [7] focus on loading time integrity check. It is
challenging to realize runtime attestation because it requires
the attestation agent to run securely inside the attesting
platform managed by an untrusted OS. FIMCE has the
natural fit to this problem. Intuitively, the agent resembles
a kernel module which is shielded by the FIMCE and runs
side-by-side with the OS. The attestation agent can read the
kernel objects without facing the challenging semantic gap
problem [25], [26], [27], [28]. To support kernel memory
read, the entire kernel page table is reused in the FIMCE.
The hypervisor properly configures the EPTs such that only
the agent code pages are executable in order to prevent
untrusted kernel code from executing inside the FIMCE.
We observe that it is difficult, if not impossible, for mem-
ory isolation schemes to achieve the same security goals
described above. One of the fundamental reasons is that the
OS in those schemes still manages the CPU cores. The OS
can schedule off the protected execution thread from its CPU
core before its attacks. In contrast, the FIMCE is immune
from the OS’s tampering and can function continuously.
6. Evaluation
In this section, we first discuss the security of FIMCE
with a comparison with memory isolation. We then report
our prototype implementation as well as the benchmarking
and experimental results.
6.1. Security Analysis
It remains as an open problem to formally prove the
security of a system design (not implementation). There-
fore, the security analysis below is informal. We first argue
that the multicore complications plaguing memory isolation
systems are not applicable to our design. We then evaluate
FIMCE security based on it attack surface and TCB size.
Complication Free. Recall that Section 4.2 has enumerated
three security complications due to the multicore setting,
namely complex EPT management, insecure guest page ta-
ble checking and incapable thread identification. We remark
that they all vanish in FIMCE.
• The EPT management of FIMCE is rather tidy. The
EPT used for the OS (and the applications) are not
affected by FIMCE while the EPT used for the
FIMCE is static after it is launched. Since the trusted
and untrusted execution flows do not interleave with
each other on any CPU core, the hypervisor does not
need to trace the executions in order to switch EPTs.
In addition, the attacks in Section 3 that exploit stale
TLB entries are infeasible. The physical memory of
the FIMCE is never accessed by threads outside of
the environment. Moreover, when a FIMCE is termi-
nated, the TLB entries in the core are all flushed out.
Hence, there is no stale TLB entry in the system.
• FIMCE does not suffer from the issue of guest page
table checking. The execution inside the FIMCE
does not use any data controlled by the guest OS
including the page tables, which makes Iago-like at-
tacks impossible. It is also clear that the full isolation
is not subject to the race condition attack described
in Section 4.2.
• Memory isolation schemes need subject identifica-
tion to choose the proper EPT setting. This challeng-
ing problem does not exist in our scheme. The iso-
lated task is bound to the FIMCE instance created for
it through its whole lifetime. It exclusively accesses
the memory. The task may continue the execution
without being preempted by other threads under the
OS’s control. In case that it relinquishes the CPU, its
FIMCE hibernates without changing ownership. In
other words, all memory states and the CPU context
are saved. The CPU states are cleaned up before
be handed to the OS. When needed, the FIMCE is
re-activated from the saved state. Therefore, subject
identification is not needed.
Minimal Attack Surface. The malicious kernel in memory
isolation systems enjoys a large attack surface, as it has
the full control over the CPU cores and over the VA-to-
GPA mapping, which leads to various attacks and design
complications described in Section 3 and 4. In contrast, the
attack surface exposed by our scheme is minimal.
Owing to the full isolation approach, the FIMCE’s hard-
ware and software are beyond the kernel’s access, interfer-
ence and manipulation. The kernel cannot access the FIMCE
core’s registers, L1 and L2 caches. L3 cache is not effec-
tively accessible either because the FIMCE’s host physical
address region is never mapped to the guest. Although the
kernel may use IPI or NMI to interrupt the FIMCE, the
worst consequence is equivalent to a DoS attack. Since the
isolated code responds to the interrupts by itself, an IPI or
NMI only cause a detour of the control flow. Note that there
is no context switch inside the FIMCE.
Another attack vector widely considered in the literature
is the interaction between the hypervisor and the kernel. The
FIMCE hypervisor only exports two hypercalls, for setting
up and tear down an FIMCE respectively. Moreover, the
hypervisor does not interpose on either the guest execution
or the FIMCE execution.
The FIMCE may exchange data with threads in the
outside environment. In that case, the malicious kernel may
poison the input data to the isolated task. We acknowledge
that the protected code is subject to such attacks if no proper
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input checking is in place. However, it is out of scope of
our work to cope with such attacks.
Small TCB Size. The hypervisor is the only trusted code
in the system. Owing to its simple logic, our hypervisor
has a tiny code base with around 6K source lines of code
for runtime execution. The concurrency issue of FIMCE is
not difficult to handle. Because only the setup and teardown
code are possible to execute concurrently on different cores,
they can be guarded with simple spinlocks. Note that each
FIMCE instance does not have overlapping regions, which
also simplifies the concurrency handling.
6.2. Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of FIMCE on a
desktop computer configured with an Intel Core i7 2600
quad-core processor running at 3.4 GHz, Q67 chipset, 4GB
of DDR3 RAM and a TPM chip. The platform runs a guest
Ubuntu 12.04 with the stock kernel version 3.2.0-84-generic.
We have implemented the FIMCE hypervisor of around
6000 SLOC. The TCB of FIMCE only consists of the hy-
pervisor. It exports two hypercalls, i.e., FIMCE_start()
and FIMCE_term(), for starting and terminating a FIMCE
respectively. We slightly modify Intel’s open source TXT
bootloader tboot2 as the DRTM to load our hypervisor.
During hypervisor initialization, a set of EPT entries are
initialized such that a chunk of physical memory is reserved
for exclusive use by the hypervisor. During the OS kernel
initialization, all cores are set to use the same set of EPT,
ensuring a uniform view of the memory.
To showcase the applications of FIMCE, we have also
developed three pillars: a 7KB serial port driver pillar that
supports keyboard I/O, a comprehensive crypto pillar of
451KB size based on the mbed TLS library 3, a TPM driver
pillar of 20KB size. The implementation also encloses a
pillar management code of 413 SLOC which verifies and
links pillars in the FIMCE.
6.3. Benchmarks
Since a FIMCE occupies a CPU core exclusively, the
OS has less computation power at its disposal while a
FIMCE is running. In order to understand the overall im-
pact of a running FIMCE on the platform, we choose
multithreaded SPECint rate 2006 and kernel-build as well
as single threaded lmbench, postmark and netperf as the
performance benchmarks. We run them on top of the OS
without any FIMCE running and then repeat the evaluation
with an infinite loop running inside a FIMCE.
For the multithreaded SPECint rate 2006, we set the
concurrency level to four. Figure 4 shows that it has 15%
percent performance drop in average due to the presence
of FIMCE. In the kernel-build experiment, we compile the
Linux kernel v2.6 using the default configuration with four
levels concurrency. The results are reported in Table 1.
2. http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot/
3. https://tls.mbed.org/
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Figure 4. SPECint rate 2006 results. The numbers are the percentage of
the score with FIMCE to the score without FIMCE.
TABLE 1. KERNEL BUILD TIME, IN SECONDS
Concurrency level 4 6 8 12
W/O FIMCE 783 708 640 643
With FIMCE 900 828 797 803
Performance Loss (%) 15 17 24 24
The two sets of experiments indicate that the relative
performance loss grows with the degree of concurrency,
mainly due to more frequent context switches. Nonetheless,
the loss is bounded by the inverse of the number of physical
cores in the platform (namely 25% in our setting).
To verify our estimation that FIMCE does not incur
much performance for single-threaded applications, we run
Lmbench, Netperf and Postmark with and without FIMCE.
Figure 5 shows that most tasks of Lmbench are not affected
by FIMCE, except one task has 8% performance drop.
Similar results are also found for Netperf as in Table 2 and
Postmark as in Table 3.
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Figure 5. Lmbench results. The numbers are the percentage of the score
with FIMCE to the score without FIMCE.
TABLE 2. NETPERF BANDWIDTH WITH AND WITHOUT FIMCE
RUNNING, IN MBPS.
TCP Stream UDP Stream
W/O FIMCE 93.92 95.99
With FIMCE 93.95 95.95
Performance
Loss (%)
0.03 0
TABLE 3. SINGLE-THREADED POSTMARK PERFORMANCE WITH AND
WITHOUT FIMCE RUNNING, IN SECOND
W/O FIMCE 327
With FIMCE 330
Performance Loss (%) 1
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6.4. Component Costs
The major overhead of FIMCE is in its launching phase.
The security task’s execution inside FIMCE does not involve
the hypervisor and thus incurs no cost as compared to its
normal execution. The launching cost consists of three parts:
a hypercall (a VM Exit and a VM Entry), FIMCE setup
including resource allocation and environment setup, and
code loading.
On average, a null hypercall on our platform takes 0.31
millisecond. FIMCE setup takes about 47.33 milliseconds
which is the interval between the FIMCE_start hypercall
to the INIT signal prior to start of FIMCE execution. The
code loading time depends on the total binary size of the
loaded pillars and the security task. Table 4 shows the
time needed to copy a chunk of bytes from the guest to
the FIMCE, including preparing the mapping and memory
read/write. On our platform, every 4KB memory read and
write cost about 2µs. Pillar loading also involves integrity
TABLE 4. LOADING TIME FOR PILLARS WITH VARIOUS SIZES
Size (KB) 7 11 15 19 23 27 31 35
Time (µs) 56 58 61 63 63 65 66 68
verification. Our measurement shows that it takes about
40.3 microseconds to verify one RSA signature inside a
FIMCE. Therefore, the total cost of launching a FIMCE,
(mostly depending on the number of public key signatures
to verify), is in the range of 100 milliseconds to a few
seconds. There are several ways to save this one-time cost.
For instance, a pillar’s integrity can be protected by using
HMAC whose verification is several orders of magnitude
faster than signature verification. Another is for the hyper-
visor to cache some frequently used pillars which are used
without integrity check during FIMCE launching.
6.5. Application Evaluation
We have implemented four use cases to demonstrate
the power of FIMCE. The use cases include a password
based decryption, an Apache server performing online RSA
decryption, a long term secret protection case and a runtime
kernel state attestation case.
Password based decryption. Through this case study,
we demonstrate FIMCE’s advantage over memory isolation
in terms of supporting I/O operation. It is challenging to
protect tasks with I/O operations using memory isolation,
mainly because I/O operations are normally in the kernel
level with a large and dispersed code base and are interactive
with devices. Therefore, Driverguard[5] relies on manually
instrumenting the driver code, which is tedious and error-
prone, whereas TrustPath [29] has to relocate the entire
driver into the isolated user space code, which not only
requires significant changes on the user space, but also
burdens the hypervisor with complex functions. As a result,
there are a lot of hypercalls when issuing I/O commands
TABLE 5. MODIFIED APACHE PERFORMANCE, SSL HANDSHAKE PER
SECOND
Concurrency
Level
1 2 4 32 128 256
W/O FIMCE 7.39 13.96 20.21 26.95 27.88 29.69
With FIMCE 7.31 14.04 20.09 20.21 21.09 22.23
Overhead (%) 1 0 0.5 25.0 24.4 25
TABLE 6. OVERHEAD OF OTHER PROTECTION SCHEMES
Schemes Overhead
TrustVisor [7] 9.7% to 11.9% depending on concurrent
transaction
InkTag [9] 2% in throughput, 100 concurrent request
Overshadow [2] 20% to 50% on a 1Gbps link, 50 concurrent
request
and handling interrupts, which incurs a heavy performance
drop because of frequent expensive VM exits.
FIMCE offers a much tidier solution. The code running
inside a FIMCE is in Ring 0 and is capable of handling
interrupts. Furthermore, with hardware virtualization, the
hypervisor can channel the peripheral device interrupts to
the FIMCE core for the isolated task to process. Therefore,
a device’s I/O can be conveniently supported as long as its
driver pillar is loaded into the FIMCE.
In this case study, a program performs an AES decryp-
tion after converting a user password through the keyboard
into the decryption key. When a FIMCE is launched to
protect this program, the hypervisor isolates the keyboard
by intercepting the guest’s port I/O accesses. A serial port
pillar and the crypto pillar are loaded into the FIMCE. We
run the program with FIMCE protection for 100 times. In
average, it takes 0.94 milliseconds to decrypt the ciphertext
with 1kilobytes, which is only 5.2% slower than in the guest.
Apache Server. In this case study, we utilize FIMCE to
harden an SSL web server by isolating its RSA decryption
of SSL handshakes into a FIMCE. As noted previously,
existing systems [7], [2] on Apache protection is not secure
under the multicore setting. In their schemes, the isolated
code runs in the same thread as its caller. As a result, it
incurs frequent VM-exits and VM-entries as the control flow
enters and leaves the isolated environment. FIMCE does not
incur context switches at runtime because the isolated task
in a FIMCE runs as a separated thread in parallel as others.
In the experiment, we customize the Apache source code
so that its SSL handshake decryption function is protected
by a FIMCE. Apache runs in prefork mode with eight
worker processes. Each worker process forwards incoming
requests to the decryption function inside the FIMCE and
subsequently fetches the decrypted master secrets.
We connect our server to a LAN and run ApacheBench
with different concurrency levels. The Apache server hosts
an HTML page of 500KB. We compare it with the same
experiment without using FIMCE protection whereby all
worker processes are able to perform the decryption con-
currently. The results are shown in Table 5.
It is evident that at low concurrency level up to four,
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the FIMCE-enabled Apache server performs almost equally
well as the native multithreaded Apache. It outperforms
existing schemes listed in Table 6 due to the fact that FIMCE
does not involve costly context switches. However, its per-
formance drops with the concurrency level increasing, but
is bounded by 25%. This is because of the single-threaded
of FIMCE cannot match the performance of a multithreaded
Apache which can uses all four cores to perform concurrent
decryption. The performance of TrustVisor[7], InkTag[9]
and Overshadow[2] is not affected by concurrency, albeit
they are not secure in a multicore system due to the stifling
attack.
However, we remark that the design of FIMCE can cer-
tainly be extended to support concurrent FIMCE instances,
at the expense of more cores dedicated for security. We also
note that in real word web transactions, the time spent for
RSA decryption accounts for a much smaller portion of the
entire transactions as compared to in the benchmark testing,
because of (1) longer network delays in the Internet; (2)
more SSL sessions using the same master key decrypted
from one SSL handshake; (3) more time needed to generate
or locate the need web pages. Therefore, we expect the
performance loss of using FIMCE for a real web server
does not appear as discouraging as in our experiments.
Long Term Secret Protection. We demonstrate the mal-
leability of FIMCE architecture via the long term secret
protection case. We implemented a prototype to bind a long
term secret to a FIMCE instance. The system is booted using
DRTM. A simple security task and the TPM pillar are loaded
into a FIMCE. During loading the hypervisor extends PCR
20 accordingly. The security task seals and unseals a long
term secret to PCR17, PCR18 and PCR20 which bear
the birthmark of this FIMCE instance. We measured time
taken by the TPM seal and unseal operations inside FIMCE
and compared it with the performance inside the guest. For
running inside the guest, we converted the TPM pillar to a
kernel module and run it inside the kernel space. In both
experiments, a 20 byte long secret is used. The results are
in Table 7.
TABLE 7. TPM PERFORMANCE TEST, IN SECONDS
TPM Seal TPM Unseal
Guest 0.54 0.96
FIMCE 0.41 0.94
FIMCE shows slight speed up compared to the per-
formance inside the guest. One of the contributing factors
is that there is more code in the kernel involved when
running the TPM operations inside the guest. The kernel also
performs scheduling, because the entire operation is rather
lengthy. In contrast, due to the simple structure, FIMCE does
not have such overhead.
It is also straightforward to use this facility by the
security task. It only needs to instruct the hypervisor to load
the TPM pillar and invoke corresponding functions inside.
Compared to existing approaches that virtualize the TPM
using software such as [7], our approach places the trust
anchor directly on the hardware TPM chip. In contrast,
virtualizing TPM requires one more entity which is the
code that virtualizes the TPM to be included in the trust
chain. The architecture of FIMCE allows us to multiplex
accesses to the TPM chip in such a way that eliminate the
requirement, shrinking the attack surface and TCB.
Runtime Kernel Introspection with Attestation. We im-
plement a prototype of the introspection. We use a security
task to read the mm_struct member of the init_task
structure and measured the performance. It takes about
3.04µs to read a kernel object which is comparable with
the time (around 3.11µs) needed by the kernel itself. Our
introspection system is more efficient than [28] because
it runs natively on the hardware in the same fashion as
running inside the kernel. According to our experiment, the
speed of native instruction execution with MMU translating
a virtual address is about 300 times faster than using a
software to walk the page table. Our system also provides
stronger security because the introspection code runs with
the genuine CR3 presently used in the guest, which implies
the same address layout and mapping as the kernel.
The introspection results can be attested by the FIMCE
system to a remote verifier. As there is a chain of trust
established during FIMCE launching, it is convenient to use
the code inside the FIMCE to do runtime attestation. The
root of the trust chain is Intel’s TXT facility. When the
hypervisor is loaded, the hardware measures its integrity
before launching. The hypervisor then measures all code
during FIMCE launching. At runtime, the code inside the
FIMCE measures the kernel’s states. The measurements are
stored in various PCRs depending on the assigned localities.
Note that one of the challenges of existing TPM-based attes-
tation schemes is to have a reliable attestation agent which
(ideally) is immune from attacks of the attested objects, and
at the same time, nimble enough to dynamically perform
measurements whenever needed. FIMCE exactly offers such
a solution.
In our case implementation, the introspection code inside
the FIMCE uses the crypto pillar to signs the introspection
results with a TPM quote for PCR 17, 18 and 20 which
vouches for the FIMCE environment. The entire process
runs in parallel to the guest OS. It takes 3.47 seconds in
average to perform the entire procedure, including the time
for TPM quote operation.
7. Related Work
Virtualization Based Security. Our work is directly related
to virtualization based security systems. The immediate
benefit of virtualization is that the resources of a platform
can be partitioned such that two virtual domains cannot
interfere with each other. Following this idea, TERRA [1]
and Proxos [30] were proposed to partition a system into
a trusted domain and an untrusted domain, where critical
applications run in the former while others run in the latter.
Although this coarse-grained approach is effective and easy
to implement, its security is undermined by the large TCB
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as it encloses the operating system which is widely regarded
as vulnerable to attacks.
With the development of hardware techniques, the main-
stream commodity platforms nowadays enjoy hardware sup-
port for CPU, memory and I/O virtualization. By taking
advantage of having a more privileged bare-metal hypervisor
(a.k.a. virtual machine monitor or VMM) than the OS,
various systems [8], [12], [29] have been proposed in the
literature for diversified security purposes. Despite of the
different designs, the fundamental building block commonly
used by them is the hypervisor’s capability of regulating the
guest VM’s memory accesses by properly setting attribute
bits in relevant page table entries.
Two typical examples of kernel protection are SecVisor
[8] and Lares [12]. The former proposed a mechanism to
use the hypervisor to protect kernel integrity while the latter
monitors and analyzes events in kernel space by inserting
hooks into arbitrary locations of kernel. Both uses the hy-
pervisor to prevent the kernel code from being modified.
TrustPath[29] and Driverguard[5] were proposed to protect
the I/O channel between a peripheral device and an appli-
cation.
Hypervisor-based memory access control also allows for
memory isolation, a technique widely used to set up a secure
execution environment to protect data security and execution
integrity of the sensitive code against an untrusted operating
system. TrustVisor [7] is a tiny hypervisor that builds such
an environment for a self-contained PAL. It further enhanced
the environment with a software-implemented TPM (called
µTPM) in the hypervisor space. µTPM can protect the PAL’s
long term secret and allows for remote attestation. Since
the PAL is required to be self-contained, TrustVisor is not
an ideal solution to protect complex tasks that involve I/O
operations or that depend on libraries with a large code
base. Based on TrustVisor, XMHF [13] provides an open-
source hypervisor framework providing security functional-
ity including memory protection. Also based on TrustVisor,
Minibox [31] combines the hypervisor with Native Client
[32] to provide a two-way sandbox for the cloud. Another
line of research is to protect the entire application. Over-
shadow [2], InkTag [9], and AppShield [10] are exemplary
works in this category which are capable of isolating a whole
application from the untrusted OS. In both Overshadow and
InkTag, the memory regions isolated for the application are
encrypted when the OS takes control. While Overshadow
and AppShield are mainly designed for application data
secrecy and integrity, InkTag is concerned about verifying
the OS behaviors by using the paraverfication technique
which mandates changes on the kernel’s code. A common
challenge for isolating an application is to handle the system
calls. All three scheme requires intensive work on system
call adaption and parameter marshaling. Different from the
coarse-grained cross VM isolation used in Terra [1], these
systems provides fine-grained in-VM isolation. Unfortu-
nately, as we shown later, their security hardly withholds
under a multicore setting.
Isolation With Other Techniques.
Flicker [33] makes use of trusted computing techniques
to set up a secure execution environment at runtime. It
explores AMD’s late launch technology which incorpo-
rates the TPM-based Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement
(DRTM). The late launch technique sets up a secure and
measured environment to protect a piece of code and data.
The drawback is its high latency due to the slow speed of
the TPM chip. Moreover the protected code cannot interact
with the rest of the platform.
The recently announced Intel Software Guard Exten-
sions (SGX) [34] offers a set of instructions for an appli-
cation to set up an enclave to protect its sensitive code and
data. The hardware isolates the memory region and ensures
that data in the region can only be accessed by the code
within. All other accesses are rejected by the hardware.
Nonetheless, it is not able to support secure I/O operations,
e.g., taking a password input from the keyboard.
Trustzone [35] in ARM platforms provides a more
versatile secure execution environment. As shown in TZ-
RKP [36], a security monitor residing in the secure world
established by TrustZone can protect the OS kernel in the
normal world at runtime.
Virtual Ghost [37] uses language level virtual machine
to prevent an untrusted OS from accessing an application’s
sensitive memory regions. It requires compiler support and
source code instrumentation on the kernel code in order to
ensure control-flow integrity at runtime.
PixelVault [38] creates an isolated execution environ-
ment on GPU. Being an isolated device from the CPU
with its own memory, GPU provides a natural ground for
building an isolated execution environment. In the past,
programming on GPU had been hard because of its highly
specialized hardware, however, modern GPU is becoming
ever-increasingly more programmable so that running code
for execution on GPU is easier. Nonetheless, this approach
still requires significant development effort because there is
little support from current systems.
SICE [39] isolates a program that ranges from an in-
strumented application to a complete VM from the guest
OS using System Management Mode (SMM). Compared
to microhypervisor appraoch, it consists of a smaller TCB
since the TCB only consists of the hardware, BIOS and
SMM. However, compared to virtualization, SMM is less
standardized, which makes it hard to apply SICE’s approach
on certain platforms. For example, SICE’s multiple proces-
sor support relies on hardware features only available on
AMD processors.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have undertaken an in-depth study
on virtualization based isolation on multicore platforms.
Our results show that the current mainstream approach of
using the page tables to isolate a sensitive memory region
is cumbersome and ineffective. We have demonstrated two
specific attacks on XMHF and BitVisor to show their design
flaws. Furthermore, we propose FIMCE, a stronger and
tidier isolation scheme for multicore systems. FIMCE places
13
the protected task into a fully isolated computing environ-
ment where neither hardware nor software resources are
accessible to any code in the untrusted domain. Our design
is featured with strong security due to its minimal attack
surface and with great nimbleness and versatility due to its
architectural advantages. We have implemented FIMCE and
experimented it with several testing cases which demonstrate
various advantages over alternative techniques.
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